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Deweyan democracy, neoliberalism, and action research  
Abstract 
This article aims to establish a line of continuity between John Dewey’s democratic and 
educational ideals and the practice of action research, to justify that the latter affords an 
adequate means to enact Dewey’s ideals against the destructive challenges that 
neoliberalism poses to democracy today. This aim involves three ideas that will be 
developed in three corresponding sections. After the Introduction, the first section analyzes 
at length the main tenets of Dewey’s thoughts about democracy by emphasizing the role of 
the educational dimension. The article then approaches neoliberalism by focusing on one of 
its variants, New Public Management, and explains why the latter implies a direct erasure 
of Dewey’s ideals concerning democracy, individual growth, education, and social 
advancement. Finally, the third section turns to action research and its potential to 
encourage our societies to move closer to Dewey’s democratic ideals, and suggests that 
action research can begin to fill the gap that Dewey’s work left concerning the institutional 
dimension of democracy.  
Keywords. John Dewey, Democracy, Education, Neoliberalism, Action research, 
Institutions and Administration  
 
 





This article aims to establish a line of continuity between Dewey’s democratic and 
educational ideals and the practice of action research, and then to justify why the latter is an 
adequate means to actualize Dewey’s ideals in today’s society, and implement them against 
the destructive challenges that neoliberalism poses to democracy. Though the article 
establishes no new connection (Dewey remains an essential figure for educational thought 
and in action research literature) not many texts have brought together his political and 
educational philosophies and how they relate to neoliberalism and action research into a 
single, coherent argument, as this text wishes to do. As such, the article finds inspiration in 
the belief that Dewey’s understanding of democracy continues to be valid and 
transformative today, in an age defined by neoliberalism; and, additionally, that action 
research has inherited this potential for transformation.  
The backbone of this article is a reading of Dewey that is partial in a quantitative and 
qualitative sense of the word. Firstly, the interpretation offered in the following section is 
mainly reduced to his magnum opus, Democracy and education, together with minor early 
and middle works. Secondly, the explanation and analysis of Dewey’s philosophy draws on 
conceptual and logical tropes that are not easily found in his own pages, and which may 
even be considered foreign to American pragmatist philosophy as a whole—these tropes 
being “opposition”, “synthesis”, “determination”, and “structure”, which betray my own 
foundation in European critical theory. Although far, I hope, from having concocted a 
fictional Dewey of the sorts Richard Rorty made up in a lovely paper from 1988, wherein 
he basically made Dewey write what he would have liked him to say, this article 
acknowledges from the outset the idiosyncratic character of its reading of the American 
pragmatist in establishing a specific connection between his philosophy, action research, 




and neoliberalism. At the heart of this conceptual enterprise remains, however, what I 
believe to be the main idea also in Dewey’s thought and, especially, in Democracy and 
education: namely, that democracy is the way through which education and society could 
improve themselves. As Stone (2016) has noted, “when considering Dewey’s definition [of 
democracy] it is significant that it is fundamentally a view of education” (p. 79). This basic 
idea is our point of departure.  
Democracy, schools, and society 
Dewey was never more concrete about that “form of associated living . . . [of] 
conjoint communicated experience” (Dewey 1916/2012, p. 101) which he called 
democracy than when he identified it with a “number of individuals . . . participat[ing] in an 
interest so that each has to refer his own action to that of others, and to consider the action 
of others to give point and direction to his own” (p. 101). For him democracy was a 
complex form of socialization involving individuals who identified their common interests 
and coordinated their thoughts and actions to materialize their shared goals. Democracy, in 
other words, existed whenever individuals freely and equally participated in the theoretical 
and material production of the world and of their society, in designing its aims but also in 
bringing them into practice. Of course, the concrete, historical realizations of this abstract 
definition varied greatly from one political system and historical period to another; some 
societies actualized the democratic idea to a fuller and wider extent than others. 
Nevertheless, Dewey (1927/1998) insisted that democracy was consubstantial with human 
socialization or, in his own words, that “democracy is not an alternative to the principles of 
associated life. It is the idea of community life itself” (p. 295). As the first chapters of 
Democracy and education (and other works) make clear, no human community could 




survive without including a minimum of democratic life within itself. In this sense, Straume 
(2016) argued that Dewey’s conception of democracy would be “prepolitical” (p. 40).  
It should now be easier to picture the two-fold, logical argument that Dewey plots in 
his major work. The reader can find this in Figure 1, articulated around two overlapping 
and inverted triangles. The book’s architecture ties together two conceptual arguments, the 
first through which (1) this pre-political notion of democracy, understood as synonymous 
with the principles of interaction and associated life, unrolls itself and aspires to attain its 
perfect historical form, and secondly (2) a Hegelian-like dialectics in which the institutional 
opposition between school and society plays itself out and is theoretically resolved. The 
first argument involves only the abstract concept of democracy as it is “carried to its final 
limit, viewed as completed, perfected” (p. 295), while the second one plots a complex 
dialectics between two historically differentiated institutional realities. Were we to visually 
represent Dewey’s masterpiece, as does Figure 1, then the first conceptual line—
democracy’s travail toward its ideal realization in history: the growing possibilities for 
interaction and living that democracy would be able to encompass, symbolized by the 
gradual widening of the triangle’s base—would act at the same time as a vertical axis 
around which the institutional dialectics between school and society would simultaneously 
develop itself. The partial realizations of democracy would correspond to the yet imperfect 
ways in which society and the schools interrelated at certain periods in history. At the end, 
in their final synthesis, the concepts of school and society would joyfully collapse into the 
other: having accomplished their best democratic possibilities, education would become 
undistinguishable from social life, and social life from education. Yet rather than narrowing 
or bringing history to a close, the ideal synthesis of school with the rest of institutions of 
society would coincide with the full expansion of human interaction, the embodiment of the 




democratic ideal in perfected institutions, the stage in which human beings would finally be 
able to interact among themselves and with nature free at last, not of institutions tout court, 
but of the tensions deriving from their internal dialectics.  
Figure 1 identifies five critical moments in the dialectical unfolding of schools and 
the rest of institutions of society. Some of these moments actually took place in history 
while others did not and, accordingly, belong to a future that is more or less utopian, as has 
been said (Bernstein 2010; Cunha 2016). I am concerned here only with logical moves or 
qualitative breakthroughs rather than with their historical realization. “It goes without 
saying”, Dewey (1916/2012) admitted, “that we are far from such a social state; in a literal 
and quantitative sense, we may never arrive at it” (p. 370). Still, the inaugural moment of 
the school/society dialectics does connect to a historical event; I am referring to the 
founding, at some point during the middle Ages, of the school as a specific, educational 
institution. Only then did it make sense to speak of a contradiction and an ensuing 
dialectics, when schools emerged as something different from the rest of the social milieu, 
and educating became a specific social practice. According to Chapter two of Democracy 
and education, schools originated out of the need to guarantee cultural heredity in societies 
that were growing more and more stratified and complex, on account of the social division 
of labor. In those social milieus, the young could no longer learn what they needed to 
become productive members of society in the same ways as the previous generations had 
done, i.e., through the direct interactions that children have at home with their parents, or 
the exchanges between master and apprentice.  
Having explained the origin of schools in this way, Dewey then sets out to analyze 
their negative educational side effects. Before schools existed, he claims, education was 
rooted in the ebbs and flows of community life, indistinguishable from social interaction, 




embedded in numerous exchanges. Insofar as this was the case, education also participated 
in the democratic quality that—as said above—Dewey included to some extent in most 
forms of socialization. Education, understood as the experience through which individuals 
knew themselves and their environment better—and, as a result, grew better at transforming 
their reality according to better-defined aims (Dewey 1912/2012, p. 376)—was something 
that occurred while individuals identified their common interests and coordinated their 
thoughts and actions to materialize their shared goals. Yet once schools emerged as “mere 
teaching institutions”, not “educating institutions”—a neat distinction proposed by 
Kerschensteiner (1933, p. 230, cited in Gonon 2000, p. 142)—this democratic quality could 
no longer permeate the interactions that occurred inside them.  
This is the entrenched problem of schools qua schools. While socialized, 
contextualized, purposeful, and more or less democratic forms of learning continued to 
exist outside schools, inside them, by contrast, loads of theoretical content was transmitted 
at all costs in order to substitute for the collective uses of intelligence and practice, and at 
the expense of the relevance, purpose, and democratic qualities of the educative process. In 
doing so, Dewey pointed out that schools adopted a notion of knowledge that pertained to 
the advantaged social classes, which were the same ones whose younger generations the 
schools were primarily aimed at educating. Not by chance did the emergence of schools 
imply, according to Bauman (1987/2013), that a whole range of “traditional, self-managing 
and self-reproducing culture was laid in ruins” (p. 67). “Thus we reach the ordinary notion 
of education”, said Dewey (1916/2012), “which ignores its social necessity and its identity 
with all human association that affects conscious life, and which identifies it with imparting 
information about remote matters and the conveying of learning through verbal signs” (p. 
10). 




Through the nearly five hundred pages of Democracy and education, Dewey labored 
hard to find a solution to this problem, which plagued education in his day as much as it 
does ours. His solution consisted of two dialectical moves: namely, (1) to socialize schools 
(2) so that schools would further democratize society. Each of these moves connected with 
one of the two conceptual lines exposed above. For instance, concerning the school/society 
institutional dialectics, Dewey claimed that the former should open up and decidedly 
import features from the most democratic institutions of US society: “The school”, in 
Noddings’ (2010) words, “should be organized as a miniature society, one that incorporates 
the best features of the developing, democratic, larger society” (p. 283). Once this occurred, 
Dewey expected that the newly educated generations would leave school and transform the 
worst—i.e., least democratic—institutions and spaces in society, contributing in this way to 
democracy’s historical refinement. Let us deal separately with each of these dialectical 
moves.  
To socialize schools… 
Dewey (1916/2012) described the first move in the 1915 Preface to Democracy and 
education: “The following pages embody an endeavor to detect and state the ideas implied 
in a democratic society and to apply these ideas to the problems of the enterprise of 
education” (p. v). To become fully socialized, schools had to assume features coming 
mainly from three institutions: the household, the political institutions of the US republic, 
and industrial production. All three carried with them democratic features that schools 
would have to synthesize and transform into a new kind of educational reality. From 
families, Dewey (1915/2001, p. 24) thought that schools could reproduce the manner in 
which informal learning occurred at home, in ways that were fully contextualized in terms 
of familial purposes and material resources. From the US political system, on the other 




hand, schools could apply the kind of institutional inventiveness (Stone 2016) through 
which political institutions had extended deliberation and decision-making among the 
different segments of the population, disregarding divisions of social class, gender, or race 
(Dewey 1916/2012, p. 304).  
Yet the main inspiration for schools should come from economic production and 
especially from industrial work. In actuality, the latter realized democracy to a fuller extent 
than universities or academia in general, peopled by learned intellectuals laboring at the 
other side of the theory and practice divide (Dewey 1916/2012, p. 272). In terms of the 
democratic—and educational—quality of its interactive processes, for Dewey the only 
thing missing from industrial work under capitalism was for the workers to freely decide 
the aims and interests of their own labor and production processes, and also for them to 
deliberate on and design how to better fulfill those common aims. As for the remainder of 
democratic standards, industrial work satisfied them all: it was a purposeful activity 
involving constant interaction with the natural and social worlds, and informed—as will be 
explained next—by inquiry and scientific knowledge. It was therefore full of the potential 
to “intensify and enlarge the scope of conscious experience” (p. 350), which was 
characteristic of educational and democratic experiences alike.  
To turn industrialized production into an ideal unit of social life, however, it was first 
necessary to blow democratic intelligence into it, which in turn involved two things: First, 
to disclose and bring home to workers the immense scientific knowledge that lay behind the 
technological breakthroughs that had already revolutionized all economic sectors. After two 
industrial revolutions, Dewey (1916/2012) considered that “industry has ceased to be 
essentially an empirical, rule-of-thumb procedure, hand down by custom. Its technique is 
now technological: that is to say, based upon machinery resulting from discoveries in 




mathematics, physics, chemistry, bacteriology, etc.” (p. 367). Now that economic 
production was applied science, there was no reason why workers should not educate or 
familiarize themselves with the immense scientific knowledge that subtended their work, 
further narrowing the gap between theory and practice. Furthermore, it was also necessary 
for industrial workers to provide themselves with an institutional architecture that enabled 
them to collectively identify common goals and design and supervise the steps necessary to 
realize them. In other words, industrial production had to import from politics its 
democratic institutional reach (p. 304). On this regard, Bernstein (2010), Gonon (2000), 
and Straume (2016) criticized Dewey for his “little emphasis on institutional analysis—on 
what sorts of institutions are required for a flourishing democracy” (Bernstein 2010, pp. 
304-5). More on this in the final section.  
Ultimately, the desired educational synthesis of family life, of the political 
institutions in the republic, and industrial production came in the form of occupations, “a 
mode of activity on the part of the child which reproduces, or runs parallel to, some form of 
work carried on in social life” (Dewey 1915/2001, p. 83). Occupations were fully described 
in chapter XXIII of Democracy and education: “The key to the present educational 
situation”, it said, “lies in a gradual reconstruction of school materials and methods so as to 
utilize various forms of occupations typifying social callings, and to bring out their 
intellectual and moral content” (1916/2012, p. 369). Considered as pedagogical units, 
occupations were different from anything schools had imagined until then: Inspired by the 
economic sphere, Dewey’s hope was that through occupations schools would harmoniously 
integrate practical and intellectual work into a single pedagogical action (Kliebard 2006). 
School socialization through occupations would channel the experimental quality found in 
workshops, industrial production, and scientific laboratories towards the fulfillment of 




social aims that, in this case, the whole school community—children, teachers, even 
parents—would have previously deliberated on, agreed upon, and designed. On the other 
hand, occupations were equally distant from the economical, profit-oriented emphasis of 
vocational education (Boostrom 2016) and from the elitist and fleshless theoretical 
production that characterized academia. “With school occupations,” Dewey (1915/2001) 
explained,  
the aim is not the economic value of the products, but the development of social 
power and insight. It is this liberation from narrow utilities, this openness to the 
possibilities of the human spirit, that makes these practical activities in the school 
allies of art and centers of science and history. (p. 13) 
Occupations were the pedagogical units that Fritzpatrick (1918) would end up calling 
projects, which revolved around “hearty purposeful act[s]” (p. 4). In accordance with 
Dewey’s argument, Fritzpatrick saw the latter as “the typical unit of the worthy life” so he 
logically concluded that they should also become “the typical unit of school procedure” (p. 
6). Rather than a mere reproduction of an existing dynamics, school socialization through 
occupations should imply, above all else, an original and unexplored synthesis, a case for 
novelty. In terms similar to those employed by Luke (2018, p. xi), Dewey insisted on the 
idea that the same autonomy that had allowed schools to remain isolated for ages from the 
democratic quality that infused life into the rest of social spheres and institutions could 
also, under adequate circumstances, allow schools to simultaneously inaugurate 
unprecedented forms of communicative and productive social interaction. Schools should 
be able to move from the last wagon to the vanguard of democracy. Although their 
occupations retained the material and empirical qualities of economic production, they had 
no need to respect the capitalistic division of labor nor the need for profit that capitalism 




enforced. They could shape themselves in line with the democratic belief that people had 
the right to lead an inquiry, a design, an action plan, and finally transform their 
environment in line with a common good they had previously and freely discussed and 
agreed upon. So long as school occupations remained within these parameters, they would 
be truly educative in the sense of “add[ing] to the meaning of experience and which 
increases ability to direct the course of subsequent experience” (Dewey 1916/2012, p. 90). 
… to further democratize society 
In “My pedagogic creed”, Dewey (1897/1998) stated that “education is the 
fundamental method of social progress and reform” (p. 234). In the context of Democracy 
and education’s internal logic, this meant that once schools were able to reproduce within 
their walls the best examples of productive and democratic life, students so educated would 
step outside, into the social world, determined and resolved to amplify and deepen the 
quality of democracy whenever and wherever it was weaker and more precarious. Dewey 
trusted that these new generations of students, educated through occupations, would not 
settle for anything less than fully actualizing in their daily lives the whole range of practical 
and intellectual capacities they would have grown accustomed to inside these reformed 
schools. “Such an education will of itself tend to do away with the evils of the existing 
economic situation”, Dewey (1916/2012, p. 304) assured. Socialized schools would form 
fully democratic citizens resolute and steadfast to fighting for a rich and worthwhile adult 
life.  
This was Dewey’s optimistic move, one through which new schools necessarily 
prefigured a new democratic society. Yet, as will be described in the next section, the 
outside world had its own entrenched economic problems that demanded specific, non-
educational responses. Though generations educated in occupations might be more 




qualified to solve capitalism’s problems, education by itself would not lead directly to the 
perfect democracy. Due to his resistance to analyze the institutional and economic changes 
necessary to implement his vision of democracy—above all, to guarantee that the control of 
the economic region did not “remain external and autocratic from the people” (1916/2012, 
p. 304)—Dewey did not describe this new society. He offered glimpses, though, of the new 
balances that should characterize it, but only as a contrast to the negative tendencies that he 
found in his own day. Overall, Dewey’s idea of a more democratic society meant that 
divisions arising from social class, trade, race, or even gender, would never prevent all of 
its members from engaging in interactions in pursuit of new forms of communication and 
production (Detlefsen 1998). Social diversity should never result in social divides that 
democratic exchanges could not overcome; “the threats of differentiation and plurality—
distrust and conflict—[should be] tempered by communication and common experiences” 
(Straume 2016, p. 33).  
Figure 1 offers a concrete understanding of the logical contours of what life in 
Dewey’s perfected democratic society might look like. Through its last phases, Figure 1 
takes a qualitative step beyond the two dialectical moves explained above and ventures to 
suggest that, just as schools should import within their walls the purposeful logics of 
society, Dewey’s (1916/2012) dialectics would then export project-work—redefined 
occupations—outside educational institutions, to the remaining institutions and social 
practices. In other words, dissolving the opposition between schools and society would 
demand that the entire community—not just school members—participated in educational 
projects, and in non-capitalistic versions of occupations which had already freed themselves 
“from extraneous associations and from the pressure of wage-earning . . . truly liberalizing 
in quality” (p. 235). As far as Democracy and education’s logic suggests, Dewey’s utopian 




society would be one in which school projects’ democratic, social, and educational 
dynamics would end up permeating throughout the entire social realm. Projects would 
become the basic social unit regulating life in and outside of school. Ideal life would 
consist of a never-ending series of educational projects.  
Thanks to this dialectical synthesis whereby the different social spheres and 
institutions ended up sharing the best of themselves with each other, Dewey’s dialectics got 
rid of a series of oppositions and established different lines of continuity: not only between 
education and work, which would become undistinguishable in truly democratic society, 
but also between childhood and adult life. “Youth democracy,” Stone (2008) argued, 
“fosters adult democracy” (p. 10). In line with Dewey’s (1897/1988) claim that education 
was “a process of living and not a preparation for future living” (p. 230), when designing 
and implementing concrete solutions to their most urgent problems, adult workers would 
actualize the same methodological unit that Dewey recommended schools use in order to 
activate children’s talents in school environments: projects. Life had to be “growth” always, 
“continual reorganizing, reconstructing, transforming” (1916/2012, p. 59). And it had to be 
so at all costs, for the child as much as for the adult. The difference between the latter 
should not be one which distinguished “grown and not growth,” Dewey insisted, “but 
between the modes of growth appropriate to different conditions” (p. 59).  
[Figure 1. Dewey’s (1916/2016) two-fold argument] 
Neoliberalism, privatization, and New Public Management 
In the end, occupations did not end up becoming the privileged pedagogical unit for 
educating in socialized, reformed schools; nor were they accordingly freed from capitalist 
pressure for profit; nor were they finally exported to the rest of spheres and institutions in 
society, as the structural unit for social interaction in democratic, communal life. None of 




this happened, which is why I claim in Figure 1 that these dialectical moments belong to a 
utopian future. Dewey had seen the seeds of radical democracy in North-American homes, 
politics, and industrial production, but the future would dictate otherwise. “The revolution 
is still incomplete”, he wrote (1916/2012, p. 301) in 1916, and it would remain so. 
According to Cunha (2016), a century after his masterpiece, “the contemporary world is 
being increasingly dominated by a mentality that diametrically diverges from what Dewey 
projected as possible … ; the relations we establish with each other are an instance of what 
Dewey called ‘obstruction to full and flexible social interaction and intercourse’” (p. 31). 
As we now know, the future that actually happened was called neoliberalism. As 
shown in the impressive volume edited by Mirowki and Phehwe in 2009, The road from 
Mont Pèlerin. The making of the neoliberal thought collective, within the neoliberal cosmos 
there is a plurality of political practices and philosophical theories (some of which were 
being drafted in central Europe during Dewey’s lifetime), all of which defy simplification 
of the term. To Dewey’s credit, however, we can at least agree that neoliberalism was the 
culmination of some of the dynamics he denounced in his own day, related to the 
burgeoning separation between the corporate class and social majorities. Radical social 
division—democracy’s main enemy—finally presented itself as a result of unfair wealth 
distribution and capital accumulation. On the backs of the immense surpluses generated by 
industrial capitalism, economic power and its political ramifications gradually allowed the 
corporate class to shape and control the non-economic institutions of society (education 
included) so that their internal workings would never lead to radical democratic 
transformations (Judt 2011). Rather than the final democratization of industrial production 
and thereby of the entire society, the twentieth century witnessed the nightmarish reversal 




of Dewey’s promise: the ratio of capitalist profit colonized all of the spheres of social 
practice.  
Many were the times (Dewey, 1916/1980, p. 138, for example) when Dewey included 
worrying remarks about power imbalance and the traces this was leaving on the ideological 
landscape of the United States. For instance, he identified a new individualism (Dewey 
1931) or pseudo-liberalism which, by assimilating “democracy with economic 
individualism as the essence of free action, has done harm to the reality of democracy” 
(1941/1988, p. 277, cited in Detlefsen 1988, p. 312). In due time, neoliberalism would rise 
as the final distortion of liberalism, ready to redesign human sociability around 
anthropological concepts  (Dardot & Laval, 2010/2014) that were entirely foreign to 
Dewey’s own tenets. In a similar fashion to how “the new individualism was interpreted 
philosophically … as an assertion that each individual’s mind was complete in isolation 
from anything else” (Dewey 1916/2012, p. 356), neoliberalism ended up translating 
individual agency—also towards oneself, as conveyed by human capital—exclusively in 
terms of economic entrepreneurship. Accordingly, instead of a diverse range of interactions 
occurring in a diverse range of social practices (including the home or political, economic, 
and educational institutions, each with its specific democratic potential) contemporary 
neoliberalism offers only one way for individuals to socialize and abandon their isolated 
nature: the market and its logic of supply and demand. Suddenly, investment and 
consumption become the only meaningful acts. No other dimensions of human nature and 
experience are considered, except as a qualification of the above. In the sphere of 
education, Knight Abowitz (2005) has also diagnosed and denounced the ill-gotten 
consequences of the “colonization of the public spheres by the private and particularly the 
market-based spheres of commerce” (p. 359. For education and neoliberalism, see also 




Boyles 2000 and Saltman 2015). Therefore, Harvey (2005) characterized neoliberalism as 
“a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human wellbeing can best be 
advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional 
framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade” (p. 
2). 
As for the paths through which neoliberalism imposed itself historically, there can be 
no doubt that privatization— “a transfer in control and/or ownership of business and 
industry from the public realm to the private” (Mansfield 2007, p. 393)—soon became the 
privileged strategy (Morales, Gendron, & Guénin-Paracini 2014). Conceptually speaking, 
privatization based and still bases its success on the realization that, without the shelter of 
the State, nothing can protect the specific meanings, values, and forms of interaction 
through which the different social practices try to realize their particular aims through the 
State. It may sound paradoxical, but it was precisely by respecting the autonomy of health 
care, education, and social welfare, for example—the key pillars of the public sector—that 
the State participated in these social practices at the same time as it secured their specific 
ratios. This was the approach followed by the administrative model that prevailed in the 
post-war years of the twentieth century—Progressive (or traditional) Public Administration 
(PPA from now on)—, through which the western world strengthened both democracy and 
the welfare state (Box, Marshall, Reed, & Reed 2001; Lynn Jr 2006 ; Vivian & Maroun 
2018). By respecting their autonomy and catering to the necessary conditions under which 
professionals working in each of these spheres could do their job well, PPA made sure that 
health care remained health care, and education, education. Conversely, these social 
practices counted on the protection of the State precisely because every citizen had the right 
to benefit from them.  




Through privatization, however, neoliberalism fueled the idea that the different social 
spheres—its respective practices, their institutions, and professionals—possessed no 
autonomous, essential values whose realization, in turn, the State had to secure and respect. 
Suddenly, this argument became suspicious of covering up for public servants maintaining 
professional privileges or spurious interests that could not be openly confessed (Siltala 
2013). Through privatization, neoliberalism imposed the idea that there was no justification 
outside the market; rather, it was the market that should establish what health care, 
education, or social welfare (or transportation, or postal communication, or airport security, 
as a matter of fact) were, in the same way as it established the price and value of 
commodities: through the well-known mechanisms of supply and demand (Dardot & Laval 
2010/2014). In the end, the basic assumption of neoliberalism was that the meaning of the 
different social spheres was not for the State and specific, autonomous professionals to 
secure and determine. As Lorenz (2012) reminds us, “neoliberalism silently uncouples the 
globalized individual from the fundamental rights formerly connected to national 
citizenship” (p. 602). Health care, for example, would simply be what independent, rational 
customers wished to buy into as health care.  
From the 1980s onwards, on the tracks of the oil crisis, neoliberalism found an 
indirect way to impose itself, one different from privatization: New Public Management 
(NPM from now on). The literature defines this model as the “application of [the] dogmas 
of the neoliberal economy to the domain of what used to be called the public sector” 
(Lorenz 2012, p. 603). “A key aspect of NPM,” Vivian and Maroun (2018) underline, “is 
the view that the public sector should replicate policies and practices that are already 
accepted or institutionalized in the private sector” (p. 47). As can be seen, NPM—the 
administrative model that came to replace PPA by the 1990s—presented itself as a 




surprising mix: Unlike privatization, it kept alive capitalism’s traditional enemy—the 
public sector—but under a completely different guise (Ellwood & Newberry 2007). It was 
more interested in managing the state as if it were a company than in directly privatizing it 
(Botticelli 2017) (although this could easily be the end-result of NPM logic). In the final 
chapter of The road from Mont Pèlerin, Mirowski (2009) agreeably concluded that “a 
primary ambition of the neoliberal project is to redefine the shape and functions of the state, 
not to destroy it” (p, 436). Indeed, the main characteristic of NPM was that it substituted 
market-based principles for the plural rationalities that, as explained previously, the State 
was traditionally willing to respect and protect. Through a bizarre isomorphic process, the 
State mirrored the market and ended up hollowing out the specific meanings of the different 
social practices, assuming that the fundamental services that the public sector provided 
could be managed according to the transparent, universal, and authoritarian logic of “cost 
efficiency” and “value for money” (Adi & Dutil 2018). Supply and demand should 
substitute for all the social rationalities. 
As LeGrand (1999) analyzed in depth, this logic became embodied in a massive 
cohort of managers—even meta-managers—placed at the head of public sector 
departments. Unsurprisingly, their arrival brought forth a radical transformation of civil 
servant typology, especially in relation to the blend of theory and practice that had 
traditionally characterized its professional ethics and vocation (Talshior 2015) and which 
had been closer to Dewey’s vision of democracy. As opposed to regular civil servants 
working in public sector departments, managers tended to have an economic background 
and little to no experience or familiarity with the professionalism of the spheres that they 
came to supervise. On many occasions, this discrepancy led to intra-departmental conflicts 
with workers whose expertise and autonomy were suddenly rendered redundant by 




newcomers who, despite their field-specific ignorance, had the authority and the winning 
hand in the decision making process. In what was a radical turn in the theoretical/practical 
divide at the public sector, managers presented themselves as neutral supervisors, experts 
who “claim[ed] to possess universally valid knowledge about organizational cooperation” 
(Siltala 2013, p. 472).  
As was soon to be discovered, the managers’ function was to establish a growing 
accountability system upon which to base and justify cost-reduction strategies. This played 
an important part in the expansion of neoliberal audit culture (Power 1997). As opposed to 
PPA’s noninvolvement in the quality of the work performed—according to Vivian and 
Moron (2018), PPA accountability focused only on the financial dimension—NPM 
included qualitative, performance indicators. The problem lay in that these indicators 
assumed and unfolded the conceptual shift from effectiveness to economic efficiency (Stone 
2002), thanks to which the indivisible nature of field-specific social actions was broken 
down into quantifiable factors (Hood 1991) whose main merit lay, in turn, in that they 
could be easily translated into specific budget lines. This understanding of social actions 
was completely foreign to Dewey’s own and to his conception of a purposeful act, which 
was not a sum of elements but rather the complete deployment, in space and time, of an 
intentional arch that started in imagination and ended up transforming reality (Dewey 
1916/2012). By contrast, to the extent that NPM retranslated a social practice as complex as 
“education”, for example—linked to values and philosophical conceptions of society, as we 
saw above—into quantifiable test scores (Au 2011) or higher-education rankings, high-
school and university managers could conjure a simplified image of their social practice to 
single out certain essential aspects over other, less important ones (Hursch 2007; Shore 
2010).  




In the end, NPM’s increasing focus on efficiency and economy was not necessarily 
compatible with the satisfaction of the specific values and aims of the social practices to 
which it was applied. The reverse was typically the case. For example, once nursing—
whose aim Stradas, Wackerhausen, and Bondas (2018) define as providing “quality of life 
as experienced by the patient” (p. 6)—was reduced to a set of predefined tasks that had to 
be forcefully completed in a certain number of minutes/hours per week, the context was set 
for uncaring relationships to come in the way of professional practice. Similarly, “the 
economic NPM definition of education ignores the most important aspects of the education 
process and therefore poses a fundamental threat to education itself”, reminds Lorenz 
(2012, p. 600). These two examples show that NPA’s restructuring processes started to 
challenge the delicate ecology that made education or health care possible in the public 
sector; finally, this ecology was given up on. Continuous budget cuts, staff reduction, 
service fragmentation, externalization, and privatization render it impossible for 
professionals working in each of these professional spheres to carry out their work 
properly, according with their internal quality standards. This process of corruption is 
simply a consequence of the State not protecting and assuming the qualitative logics of the 
social spheres that NPM aimed to supervise, let alone giving them priority over cost-
efficiency demands. “For this reason,” Lorenz (2012) adds, “the introduction of the 
management model itself is a process of de-professionalization” (p. 613). Indeed, once 
management sacrifices the core values of a given professional sphere, cost-efficiency 
remains the only guiding principle. Without an additional qualitative ratio, every additional 
cut in spending can be justified in its name.  
The previous section described Dewey’s democratic ideal in terms of individuals who 
freely and equally participated in the theoretical and material production of their own 




society, not just in designing its aims but also in bringing them into practice. Dewey 
specially wanted this ideal to make its way to industry, which had to open itself to 
democratic and scientific inquiry. Now, however, we must conclude that neoliberalism’s 
success through privatization and NPM strengthened the theory and practice divide and 
damaged the quality of democracy. It did so by imposing (1) a drastic reduction and 
impoverishment of the theory upon which social practices (and social life in general) used 
to be built, in a process that Broudy (1981) aptly defined as de-valuation; and (2) by 
enforcing an even more intense expropriation of theory in the hands of an elite of 
managerial caste that has remodeled and reinforced the theory vs. practice divide in the 
workplace. As a result, not only have neoliberal market principles become the only valid 
rationality for human interaction—not only have they come to replace a diversity of aims, 
values, and social meanings—but their design and conception have been thrust onto the 
hands of a hierarchy of experts-managers who display a single-minded, economic bent. 
Meanwhile, the majority of workers have been turned into clerks bereft of their right to 
exercise their vocation and professional autonomy (Talshior 2015). Bearing all this in mind, 
it should come as no surprise that the public sector has already been compared with the 
situation of industrial workers in Dewey’s day: “Standardization, division of work, the 
separation of monitoring from making, de-skilling have triumphed in the fields formerly 
ruled by middle-class professional cultures at the universities, in hospitals, and in schools” 
(Siltala 2013, p. 471). Indeed, it is the nightmarish reversal of Dewey’s democratic 
promise.  
Action research and democracy 
In this section the article explores the extent to which action research can genuinely 
become a powerful means to actualize Dewey’s democratic ideal in the midst of 




contemporary privatization and NPM. Action research should guide the institutional reform 
which aims to strengthen and improve democratic life in our society, a reform that is barely 
tackled or introduced in Dewey’s work (on account of his superficial treatment of the 
institutional dimension of democracy) and which is even more necessary today, in the midst 
of neoliberalism, than it was in Dewey’s lifetime. That Dewey’s philosophy and action 
research share affinities is beyond dispute (Boog 2003; Harkavy & Puckett 2014; Stark 
2014), since his work is one of the inspirations—together with Lewin’s (1946) social 
psychology, with which it shares no small number of traits (Allport 1948)—consistently 
mentioned in action research literature. In line with this view, this section defines action 
research precisely by focusing on its effort to keep science and practice together (Adelman 
1993). This has previously occurred in Dewey’s pragmatist epistemology (Biesta 2014), 
which articulated science and practice in a similar way to how education and society were 
organized in Democracy and education. Thus, just as education should not forgo the basic 
elements of social interaction—deliberation, a social purpose, and a practical dimension—if 
it was to avoid turning itself into a meaningless and repetitive activity, scientific inquiry 
needed both to arise and return to the contexts, practices, and situations of the daily life 
(Argyris, Putnam, & McLain Smith 1985). Otherwise, it would separate itself both from the 
paths of individual growth and social improvement (Dewey, 1916/2012); it would become 
“bookish” and assimilate itself to “pure theory”, to what the ancient Greeks called theoria 
(Carr 2006).  
Action research fully assumes this perspective, while also making it more concrete 
than it appears to be in Dewey’s pragmatism. As a result, I believe it also pushes 
pragmatism to its full epistemological, social, and ethical consequences (Stark 2014). A 
general transition can be noted from practice understood as an epistemological category, 




i.e., an abstract dimension of human inquiry (which Dewey connected to certain 
professions or institutions), to action research’s focus on fully contextualized social 
practices. Like pragmatism, action research is not interested in the positivist conception of 
knowledge but only in producing the “knowledge that counts”, that is, only the knowledge 
necessary for “the improvement of practice” (Brydon-Miller, Greenwood, & Maguire 2003, 
p. 13). 
Let me delve into this matter a bit more, since this is where action research finds its 
specific worth. Allow us to say that society is made up of different social spheres, each of 
which involves different practices—education, health care, social welfare, and so on. Some 
of these practices develop within institutions—like schools and hospitals—and others not, 
but all of them have their own specific meanings, aims, values, and principles of procedure; 
what Kemmins (2008, p. 4) called the “traditions in a field” (now strongly challenged by 
NPM), against which the quality of each specific social action was traditionally verified and 
assessed. If all this is true, then action research can be understood as a form of scientific 
inquiry oriented towards improving each of these social practices in the original contexts 
where they take place, and in accordance with their traditional norms and values. “The 
fundamental aim of action research”, said Elliott (1991), “is to improve practice rather than 
to produce knowledge. The production and utilization of knowledge is subordinated to, and 
conditioned by, this fundamental aim” (p. 4).  
It is important for us to understand that the principled rationalities of each social 
practice function as the alpha and the omega of action research, which limit as much as 
qualify the many dimensions of the inquiry. This is so because the improvement of practice 
implies a series of epistemological, ethical, and methodological conditions that action 
research identifies and seeks to satisfy. One of them is that research needs to be conducted 




by the same people engaged in the social practice whose betterment is being pursued 
(McIntyre 2007). Action research clearly denounces that the theory vs. practice divide 
imposed by contemporary (neoliberal) social division of labor and education is 
incompatible with professional education and growth, even though the latter divide seems 
to be perfectly tuned to the epistemology and advancement of positivist science that takes 
place in neoliberal academic institutions (Brydon-Miller, Greenwood, & Maguire 2003, pp. 
22-23). Naturally, not only are the professionals of a given social practice best familiarized 
with the values and aims at stake—they are the “custodians of the practice for their times 
and generation”, as Kemmis (2010, p. 420) said—but the truth is that only they can fully 
access the contexts where these actions are led (Stenhouse 1979/2012). This aspect is very 
significant, since improvement of practice through action research (what Dewey would call 
“education” and “growth”) can only occur amid the “multidimensional, dynamic, and 
complex” (Greenwood 2018, p. 77) contexts where the social practices tend to unfold; i.e., 
in natural situations, in contrast with laboratories that falsify and nullify the internal and 
conflictive nature of social actions. In a similar manner, for Dewey (1915/2001) education 
would remain utterly impossible in schools that had “lost their social spirit” (p. 11), that 
had disconnected from the structural elements of constituted social life.  
Brief as this synthesis has been, I hope it has justified the claim that action research 
shares basic tenets with Dewey’s idea of democracy and education, and that—precisely due 
to this—it can fight against some of the dynamics triggered by neoliberalism. Action 
research may be extremely well suited to reverse de-valuation and expropriation of theory 
that NPM and privatization have enforced since it considers the internal rationalities of 
professional practice to be “valid and vital” knowledge (Brydon-Miller, Greenwood, & 
Maguire 2003, p. 11), theories built “for particular substantive and institutional purposes” 




(McTaggart 1994, p. 332). These rationalities must not be lost and forgone, and especially 
not sacrificed to market fundamentalism; in fact the opposite is true. They should be built 
on, improved, and refined through the ecological and deontologically-oriented forms of 
inquiry that action research affords.  
From a certain angle, it seems as though action research recouples the theoretical 
and practical dimensions of each social practice by embracing research as a path for 
professionals to channel, express, and reinforce their vocation. This professional definition 
notwithstanding, the justification for action research would not lie as much in the 
institutional effectivity it may trigger as in its unwavering faith, shared with Dewey 
(1939/1982), “in the possibilities of human nature” (p. 229), in the entire scope and wealth 
of its skills. Action research also believes that life, work, and education should be 
intrinsically rewarding. While Lewin’s early initiatives demonstrated through quantitative 
studies that democratization in the workplace can lead to increased productivity (Adelman 
1993), the ultimate goals of action research would be more far-reaching and should not to 
be coopted by ideologies of “quality control” and “staff development” (Cooke 2006). The 
emancipatory potential of action research may include individuals having “a sense of 
control of their own work” (McTaggart 1994, p. 321), but its ultimate goals overlap with 
Dewey’s utopian thoughts about democracy. Whatever the many personal and institutional 
gains derived from action research may be, they should be understood as a further step in 
the “ongoing process of citizens working toward cooperative, shared governance of social 
institutions, including those of the market”, which was how Box, Marshall, Reed, and Reed 
(2001) described Dewey’s general project. Action research would also belong in a bigger 
picture in which professionals would gradually take control of all the dimensions in their 
life, precisely by insisting on, and at the same time letting themselves be carried away by, 




action research’s expanding democratic spiral. As a result, Dewey’s utopia might well be 
reformulated in terms of life (and work) consisting of a never-ending series of action 
research projects.  
Institutional implications 
How can action research actually contribute to transforming the neoliberal landscape? 
In this final section I would like to focus on action research’s potential to gear institutions 
towards Dewey’s democratic goals. In their criticism of Dewey’s work, Straume (2016) and 
Bernstein (2010) alluded to the fact that Dewey did not elaborate on the institutional 
framework that could advance his ambitious aims for democracy. However, rather than new 
institutions, it might be the case that Dewey’s utopia demanded new ways of breathing 
democratic life into the existing ones. Following through the different methodological 
phases of action research projects (Burns 2005), we can imagine how their deliberative 
phases might give professionals the chance to reformulate the abstract aims, values, and 
principles of procedure of their own social spheres to adapt them to the changing 
circumstances of their social environment. Next, the flexible participatory methods of 
action research would allow workers to use their strategic thought to imagine and design 
more adequate means to realize the aims and values of their practice. And ultimately, across 
different cycles of inquiry, workers would be able to obtain, share, and triangulate the 
evidences needed to assess the success of their initiatives, and use them to prepare ensuing 
projects that either build on or reformulate their goals. 
Still, doubts remain as to the possibility of action research ever fulfilling Dewey’s 
promise. Since Dewey first wrote Democracy and education, the obstacles that came in the 
way of his original project have become more difficult to overcome. At present, global and 
local socio-economic conditions impose severe restrictions on the space actually allowed 




for professionals to explore and enrich the democratic substratum of their institutional 
contexts. The chances are that NPM will not tolerate democratic reconstructions of the 
workplace even when they focus on strictly professional aspects, and that it will even crush 
and arrest them the moment they begin to question—as they should eventually do 
(McTaggart 1994)—power relations in society: for instance, how they impinge on a given 
social practice, and the responsibility that the corresponding professionals may have for 
maintaining the status quo. Nonetheless, action research is in a good position to justify 
itself even against these claims. For, rather than accepting and taking for granted the 
devaluation and expropriation of theory and the deskilling that go with neoliberal 
dynamics, action researchers can argue that it is precisely by strengthening the autonomy of 
their respective practices that they resist the economic colonization of the entire social 
landscape. In other words, by holding on to their specific ratios workers may not only come 
to enjoy the internal goods of their professions (MacIntyre 1981/2011) but also make sure 
that human and economic resources are allocated, distributed, and deployed according to a 
wider diversity of aims, needs, and perspectives than those mobilized and spent in the 
interest of capital accumulation. It is by building on their vocations that action researchers 
make sure that wealth is actually redistributed, and does not simply return to the hands of 
the powerful. Even if only as a bulwark against market totalitarianism, action research 
remains a logical and valuable tool for the benefit of democracy. 
In line with this argument, action research may even bear within itself a democratic 
alternative to the two models of public management and administration that have shaped 
the last fifty years of Western institutional life: NPM and the model it originally came to 
replace, PPA. PPA helped to unfold a social-democratic understanding of the public sector, 
while NPM ensued from and performed a neoliberal one. PPA was financially- and 




process-oriented, meaning that its own mechanisms of accountability focused on verifying 
the allocation and deployment of economic resources without explicitly assessing the 
quality of the given service. Vivian and Maroun (2018) thus highlighted the “independence 
of the public servant from the political process” as one of PPA’s main traits: “Elected 
officials make decisions on what needs to be done while public servants implement policy 
decisions” (p. 46). This separation catered for autonomy and professional vocation. By 
contrast, with NPM accountability was goal oriented, and interested in examining the end-
results of the service afforded. Yet the problem with NPM assessment was not that it was 
qualitative but, rather, that it was neoliberal, meaning that the criteria and standards it 
employed did not respect the specific rationalities of the different social practices 
represented in the public sector. Instead, NPM broke down the internal, indivisible quality 
of educational, health-related or welfare actions to bend them and make them conform to 
value-for-money rationality.  
Bearing all this in mind, contemporary public management and administration 
appears to be trapped and paralyzed by the following situation: On one hand, PPA enforced 
a quantitative focus designed to secure the autonomy of each social practice, but not its 
quality. On the other, NPM enforces a qualitative focus that cannot improve service quality, 
simply because it destroys its autonomy. Action research may help find a way out of this 
conundrum precisely due to its radical democratic potential. Its main contribution to 
institutional administration may consist, firstly, in its clear understanding (afforded, among 
others, by Dewey’s ideas on democracy) that the quality of the actions involved in each 
social practice can and should be assessed and accounted for, but only in accordance with 
the aims, values, and principles that are internal to it, and all of which have a raison d’être. 
And second: to the extent that professionals are not only practitioners but are in fact those 




best acquainted with field-internal theories, action research recommends that they fully 
engage and participate in the accountability process, which could easily be conducted as 
part of the assessment stage of action research projects. By formulating their own aims, 
their own strategies, methods of research, and assessment criteria, civil servants would 
realize, no matter how humbly, Dewey’s democratic goals. They would freely and equally 
participate in the theoretical and material production of their social practice, their 
institutions, and their society, by designing its aims but also by bringing them into practice. 
So as long as there remains the wish to link individual, professional growth to a more 
adequate transformation of society, action research will remain a meaningful resource. 
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